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In today’s world, smart devices are a necessity to have, and represent an essential
tool for performing daily activities. With this comes the need to secure the commu-
nication between the IoT devices in the consumer’s home, to prevent attacks that
may jeopardize the confidentiality and integrity of communication between the IoT
devices.
The life cycle of a a simple device includes a series of stages that the device un-
dergoes: from construction and production to decommissioning. In this thesis, the
Manufacturing, Bootstrapping and Factory Reset parts of IoT device’s life cycle are
considered, focusing on security. For example, the Controller of user’s home net-
work (e.g., user’s smart phone) should bootstrap the “right” IoT device and the IoT
device should bootstrap with the “right” Controller. The security is based on device
credentials, such as the device certificate during the bootstrapping process, and the
operational credentials that are provisioned to the IoT device from the Controller
during the bootstrapping.
The goal of this thesis is to achieve easy-to-use and secure procedure for setting up
the IoT device into a home network, and for controlling that IoT device from an
Android mobile phone (Controller). The objectives are: (1) explore the different
aspects of using a smartphone as a Controller device to securely manage the life
cycle of a simple device; (2) propose a system design for securely managing the
life cycle of a simple device from a Controller compliant with existing standards,
(e.g. Lightweight Machine to Machine (LwM2M) is an industrial standard used to
manage and control industrial IoT Devices); (3) implement a proof of concept based
on the system design; (4) provide a user-friendly interface for a better experience
for the user by using popular bootsrapping methods such as QR code scanning; (5)
discuss the choices regarding securing credentials and managing data, and achieve
a good balance between usability and security during the bootstrapping process.
In order to achieve those goals, the state-of-art technologies for IoT device man-
agement were studied. Then an Android application that uses LwM2M standard
in consumer’s home setting was specified, designed and implemented. The Android
application is wrapped in a smooth user interface that allows the user a good
experience when attempting to connect and control the target IoT device.
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Glossary - Abbreviations
AKE Authenticated Key Exchange
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol
DoS Denial of Service
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EC Elliptic Curves
GUI Graphical User Interface
HAP Homekit Acessory Protcol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IC Integrated Circuit
IoT Internet of Things
JCA Java Connector Architecture
JWT JSON Web Tokens
LwM2M Light Weight Machine to Machine
MAC Message Authentication Code
MFi Made for iPhone/iPod/iPad
MitM Man in the Middle
NFC Near Field Communication
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OOB Out-Of-Band
PK Public Key
PSK Pre-Shared Key
QR Quick Response code
REST Representation State Transfer
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SRP Secure Remote Protocol
SSID Service Set Identifier
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TEE Trusted Execution Environment
TLS Transport Layer Security
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TTP Trusted Third Party
UDP User Datagram Protocol
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Terminology
Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is the process of changing a device
from not operational to operational modes.
Controller
Typically a sophisticated device, e.g., smart phone
that is authorized to connect and send commands
to a simple device.
Factory reset
Restores a simple device to its original manufactu-
rer’s settings, by erasing the configurations and data
that have been accumulated by the device during its
usage.
In-band communication
Occurs over the same physical communication
channel (e.g., the home WiFi network) that carries
the bulk of data between two devices.
Out Of Band (OOB)
Communication
Happens over a physical channel that is different
from the in-band channel. OOB communication
typically involves the user.
Simple Device
A resource constrained device that is connected
to a network where it can receive commands from
a Controller device and act accordingly.
Management Data
Data that is stored in the device
in operational mode. These datas are necessary
during the operational mode of the device which
includes configuration parameters, contextual infor-
mation and operational credentials.
Nodes
When an IoT device is part of an IoT network it
is called a node.
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1 Introduction
The term Internet of Things (IoT) was first mentioned in 1999 by Kevin Ashton
exclusively for supply chain management. Today, the concept of IoT includes a
wide range of applications such as transportation and healthcare [1]. Simple devices
are resource-constrained, physical IoT devices.
IoT devices range from simple, resource-constrained devices, like light switches,
to more complex devices, such as surveillance cameras. Resource-constrained, sim-
ple IoT devices require specialized protocols that accommodate to their restricted
requirements such as limited energy or RAM. Two examples of protocol suites de-
signed for IoT devices are 6LoPan [2] and the Zigbee [3]. The Constrained Applica-
tion Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized transfer protocol that enables simple devices
to interact with other nodes in an IoT network with low bandwidth. CoAP can run
of different transmission protocols, such as SMS or Bluetooth.
1.1 Problem Definition and Goal
Secure management and operation of smart devices in people’s homes is one of
the key issues in consumer IoT. This thesis investigates an approach to solving
this issue by adapting the LwM2M industrial standard (LwM2M [4]) and using the
smart phone as the Controller of home IoT devices. In the home setting, where
the user needs to be involved during the bootstrapping (initial setup) of the simple
device by the Controller, the bootstrapping process should be user-friendly, while
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still maintaining the required level of security. In the current LwM2M specification
the bootsrapping entity in the Controller has to be pre-configured in the IoT device
before the bootstrapping operation. Thus, the LwM2M bootsrapping needs to be
adapted to the consumer’s home setting.
The objectives of this master’s thesis are to: (1) explore and investigate different
aspects of using a smart phone as a Controller device to securely manage the life
cycle of a simple IoT device; (2) Propose a system design for securely managing the
life cycle of a simple device from a Controller compliant with LwM2M standards; (3)
implement the design in a context of a consumer solution. The security requirements
in this context is of data confidentiality and proximity authentication using an ap-
plication that supports LwM2M protocol and exchanges messages using CoAP over
DTLS; (4) to study the usability aspect of the design/implementation and (5) dis-
cuss and analyse major findings regarding securing credentials and managing data
and secure usability that requires users intervening in the bootstrapping process.
Home IoT is the network of devices that this design solution creates and HomeApp
is the application that is running on the phone (Controller) which represents the
command and control unit. The controller uses DTLS protocol to secure CoAPs
messages which resides in the application layer. The proximity authentication is
due to the IoT device being in the range of a mobile phone.
1.2 Research Questions
Based on the problem description and the objectives of this thesis, the following
research questions are investigated:
• RQ1: How to securely manage the life cycle of the device using a Controller
device?
• RQ2: What types of data should be transferred between the Controller and
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the simple device and how to securely transfer and store them safely during
bootstrapping (initial setup) and operational modes (after bootstrapping)?
• RQ3: How can the Controller protect long-term credentials that need to be
provisioned to the simple device against cyber attacks?
• RQ4: How to provide a user friendly experience during the bootstrapping of
the device using QR code reading?
1.3 Structure of thesis
This document is structured to include six chapters. Chapter 2 introduces a back-
ground reading that highlights the key concepts used in the thesis, in addition to an
illustration of the current technologies that use a similar approach to problem solving
of this topic. Chapter 3, is a description of the structure of the system architecture
and system components that include the LwM2M Client, LwM2M Server, the differ-
ent interfaces and entities. Chapter 4 describes the implementation that previews
the technical solutions used to solve the problem. Chapter 5 aims at discussing
and evaluating the solution discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 6 is the conclusion,
which summarizes the results and benefits obtained from this work and possible
improvements in the future.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction to Life cycle Management
Life cycle management is a series of stages that the device undergoes from inception
to decline. The stages include: (1) construction and production of a device by
the manufacturer. (2) securely setting up and (3) managing of the device using
a controller such as a smart phone. Finally, (4) decommissioning which includes
factory reset and the end of life for a device [5]. The same paper by Rahman et
al. [5] contributes with a generic life cycle model that describes the stages that an
IoT device under goes from (re)construction to decommission. The generic life cycle
model is in the Figure 2.1 adapted from [5].
The first stage (1) is the production stage where the devices are produced in a
large scale including the installation of the necessary software. (2) The deployment
and commission phase prepares the device for operation and consists of necessary
configurations. In this phase the Controller pairs with the device using available/-
supported pairing methods. In addition to these configurations, the Controller ac-
quires the necessary secret keys for authentication and secure communication within
the network. This is also known as Bootstrapping. (3) The operation stage, consists
of execution of services and applications i.e, switching on and off a coffee machine.
(4) The update stage, where management functions are performed to update the
device. Finally, the (5) decommissioning stage where the device reaches its end of
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life. Here the device is disconnected from the network and no longer accessible.
(Re) construction
• Construction: development of initial 
software and device hardware
• Reconstruction: development of 
software components update and 
firmware update
Production
• Mass produce device hardware
• Mass deploy software
• Mass deploy cryptographic materials
Installation and 
Commissioning
• Installation: Physical placement: 
mount, connect to power.
• Commissioning: Start system 
components and configure 
cryptographic material
Decommissioning
• Factory Reset
• Disconnect device from servers
• Physical Removal
• End of Life
Operation
• Run system components used by IoT
services and IoT applications during 
their execution
• Run factory-default services and 
applications
Update
• Application and service deployment
• Application and service termination
• Application and service 
reconfiguration
• System components and firmware 
update deployment
Figure 2.1: Generic Life cycle for IoT Devices (Adapted from [5])
The primary contribution of this thesis is to identify the role of the Controller in
securing the life cycle management operations of a simple device. The Bootstrapping
phase is critical in this aspect as it is the phase where the device gets its credentials
that are used to secure the operational stage operations. Therefore, it is important
to explore and understand various security aspects of bootstrapping.
2.2 Bootstrapping in IoT
Bootstrapping is defined as the procedure in which the user attains parameters and
other security configurations that represent the authentication and authorization
means by which the user is verified into the security domain at a certain time and
location [6] [7]. Bootstrapping can occur in different stages in a life cycle of a device
and can include provisioning details that have been implemented previously during
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the manufacturing phase. It is vital to focus in this thesis on bootstrapping of re-
lated security information since once a channel is secured between a simple device
and a Controller for communication, the remaining information can be shared eas-
ily. Bootstrapping is also important as it establishes a basis of trust anchor which
shall be used to secure all communication henceforth between the Controller and the
simple device. Bootstrapping is the foundation of securing simple device life cycle
management. In terms of the classification of the available mechanisms of Boot-
strapping, some Bootstrapping tools are more user-intensive while others require
less involvement from the user. An example for this can be a user scanning a QR
code from the Controller to initiate the pairing process with a device. According to
Garcia-Morchon et al. [6] there are several classifications of Bootstrapping methods:
• Managed methods: pre-established trust relationship is used alongside au-
thentication credentials. The process takes place through authentication by
centralized servers. An example of this is Extensible Authentication Proto-
col (EAP) [8] which was designed to work during the network authorization
phase. It is applicable when the IP layer connectivity may not be present for
use. EAP is a datalink layer protocol and doesn’t support message render-
ing/handling; meaning that EAP cannot transmit bulk data unlike TCP or
SCTP. Another difference between EAP and other protocols is that in the case
of EAP, the authentication is initiated from the server instead of the client.
• Peer-to-Peer and Ad-hoc methods: these methods do not rely on pre-established
trust. The credentials are built as a result of subsequent secure communication.
The procedure includes unauthorized Diffie-Hellman exchange (secure key ex-
change method) followed by an out-of-band (OOB) communication channel to
avoid man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack.
• Opportunistic and leap-of-faith methods: Unlike other methods, this method
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does not verify the initial authentication, instead it verifies the continuity of
the connecting; assuming the attacker is not present during the initial step.
An example of this is Wifi Protected Setup (WPS) and Secure Shell (SSH) [9].
• Hybrid methods: use components from both the ad-hoc and managed methods.
To provide authenticity in bootstrapping, Stajano and Anderson [10] proposed a
metaphor called imprinting. The metaphor uses a naturally occurring process called
imprinting in animals and specifically ducklings. As the duckling emerges from its
egg it will recognize the first object it sees (that moves and makes a sound) as its
mother. The device is viewed to be the body of the duckling while the state is said
to be the software. The alive state of the duckling depends on the software being
present in the body and it is bound to the mother that it has imprinted. Upon death,
the device is returned to a pre-birth state where it is ready to accept new imprinting.
This is also known as reverse metempsychosis [11]. During the imprinting phase,
a secret shared key is exchanged between the duckling and its mother. This raises
the question of how many nodes are able to generate a shared secret and how can
we be sure that the key has been established with the right device? The answer to
this question is through physical contact. It is crucial at this point to differentiate
between interacting with other entities than the mother and being controlled by
them. In this case, a suggested solution is to always bootstrap by establishing a
shared secret to gain more specific policies to the node.
This is the main reason why many internet protocols rely heavily on Authenti-
cated Key Exchange (AKE) for setting up secure channels. For example: protocols
such as TLS and TTP (Trusted Third Party). On the other hand, a risk stands
in involving third parties such as humans in the AKE procedure; in the sense that
many shortcomings can derive as a result, and lead to vulnerabilities in the AKE
scheme [12]. This has the lead to appointing the user to be the third party in the
authentication process. The users are involved with the help of OOB channels over
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the actual network communication. The question now lies in the challenges to the
security of pairing these devices based on human-interactive security protocols. A
massive strength point in OOB is authentication and message integrity opposed to
secrecy [13]. The same paper by Kainda, Flechais, and Roscoe [13] argues that users
represent the weakest link as they are prone to distraction and have different levels
of motivation regarding performing security tasks, however, it is important to ensure
that the users are diligent to carry out their roles in the best way possible to avoid
security failures.
2.2.1 OOB Communication
With the user involvement over OOB, many OOB channels exist to provide efficient
mechanisms for bootstrapping security in ad-hoc IoT deployments as summarized
in Table 2.1. Their benefits can outweigh their drawbacks and vice versa, and they
vary in the level of user involvement in the bootstrapping process. Nowadays, quite
few smart home devices (consumer IoT devices) push the need for a companion
device such as a mobile phone to aid in the OOB process and/or later be used to
control the smart device.
• Manual Typing Manual authentication techniques have been produced to
allow wireless devices to authenticate each other through an insecure wireless
channel with the help of manual transfer of data between the devices. The
devices in the context proposed by Gehrman et al. have access to wireless
communication channel, are under the control of a single human user and if
they do not have a keypad they must at least have a single means of inputting
data. An example of this process is typing the Wi-Fi password to join a home
network. Several issues arise with this approach: (1) Users are more prone
to making mistakes as the number of digits that needs to be typed grows in
number. (2) Users might find this non-trivial step too demanding. A possible
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solution which may have a serious security weakness, is to truncate the hash-
code, for instance the first 16 or 32 bits which means 4 or 8 hexadecimal digits
[14].
• Visual The most popular and widely used is the visual OOB, which is the
QR Code that is used to encode information to the QR Code image. Initially,
QR codes were used to track automotive parts in manufacturing plants [15].
Their use has exploded into different areas such as: (1) Advertising (such as
encoding URLs into statues, geo-locations and posters for ease of access of
more information), (2) Mobile payments, (3) Access Control Krombholz et al.
[16] in their work proposed how a QR code can be used along side other security
techniques. An application generates a QR code with an encrypted password
encoded and is scanned by the PC’s camera. Another example for using visual
authentication is ChromeCast1.(4) Augmented Reality and Navigation.
Some ways in which QR codes can be altered and involved in different attack
scenarios is by replacing the entire QR code with a malicious link encoded or
modifying the individual modules of a QR code [15].
• Audio Devices that are communicating over a wireless network, and are
present within an appropriate distance from each other can use audio chan-
nels to secure pairing of these devices with human assistance, a system called
Loud-and-Clear (L&C) was developed based on this approach by Goodrich,
Sirivianos et al. [17]. Another example to using audio in OOB channels is
through using Sound-proof mechanism which relies on two-factor authentica-
tion with the second factor being the proximity of the user’s mobile device to
the device used to authenticate. The proximity of the two devices is checked
by comparing the ambient noise recorded by their microphones [18]. Audio
1Chromecast: support.google.com/chromecast/.
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based authentication is used in Amazon Alexa2 and Apple Speaker3.
• NFC Radio Near Field Communication (NFC) allows sharing of data be-
tween two devices that are within a certain proximity of about 3-5 inches [19].
Widely known vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping, data corruption and data
modification exists on NFC technology.
2Amazon Alexa: developer.amazon.com/en-US/alexa/alexa-voice-service/auth
3Apple Speaker: support.apple.com/en-us/HT208241
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OOB
Channel
Type
Controller/
Phone
Interface
Usability
Aspects
Notes References
Manual
Typing
Real or
Virtual
Keyboard
Hard to type
correctly a
long sequence
of characters.
Example: user types WiFi password to join home
network.
(1) this usability difficulty lead to
schemes where the user has to input/type only short
strings:
- Password Authenticated Key
Exchange (PAKE); Manual Auth-
entication (MANA) by Gehrmann
et al. (2004).
(2) Broadcom’s "pushbutton": the long-term key
is agreed-on using plaintext messages
over the WiFi in-band channel.
(3) Chromecast: during device setup the TV
and the smart phone display a number. The
user has to confirm (in the smart phone)
that both displays show the same number.
[14]
Visual Camera
QR may fade
with time.
Reading a QR code seems to be a frequently
used method in setting up today’s devices.
One possible reason for this is that people
are proficient in using their smart phone cameras.
[15] [16]
Audio Microphone
Audio setup
may fail due
to ambient noise.
Used in Amazon Alexa and Apple Speaker. [18] [17]
NFC Radio NFC Reader
The NFC tag
is often hard
to locate for the
end user. People
are often confused
where they need to
place the NFC reader.
Vulnerabilities include: Eavesdropping, Data
Corruption and Data Modification.
[19]
Table 2.1: OOB channel types and their usages
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2.3 CoAP - Constrained Application Protocol
As web services has become more popular and the dependency on fundamental
Representation State Transfer (REST) has grown to be more demanding. The im-
portance of Constrained RESTful Environment (Core) is directed at realizing the
REST architecture in proper form for Constrained nodes. An example for this is
6LoWPAN that supports IPv6 packets in small linklayer frames, that has a direct im-
pact on the delivery success probability for these packets. CoAP has been designed
to serve the special requirements for the constrained environment. These constrains
can range from building automation, energy and other Machine-to-Machine (M2M)
applications. The role of CoAP is not to blindly compress HTTP, but instead realize
a subset of REST common with HTTP which is optimized for M2M [20].
CoAP is based on UDP using asynchoronous messages unlike HTTPS where the
messages are synchronous. There are four message types in CoAP: (1) Confirmable,
(2) Non-Confirmable, (3) Acknowledgment and finally (4) Reset. Confirmable mes-
sages where a recipient sends an acknowledgment message to the sender. Non-
Confirmable messages are ones that do not require acknowledgment, in the scenario
where the messages are repeated for specific applications of an application. Acknowl-
edgment messages require that a specific confirmable message has reached. While
Reset indicates that a message has been received but the context is missing so it is
unable to be processed. CoAP also used methods such as GET, POST, PUT AND
DELETE quite similar to HTTP methods.
2.4 DTLS - Datagram Transport Layer Security
Some applications such as M2M require the use of fast delivery instead of reliable
delivery, to avoid delay in delivery in re-transmission and reordering packet loss is
acceptable. This calls for the use of UDP. DTLS uses UDP and the DTLS full
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handshake is displayed in the Figure 2.2 from [21]. DTLS protocol is unreliable, and
it starts with a ClientHello from the client to the server. The packet is re-transmitted
when dropped which is likely since it uses UDP. Upon successful transmission, the
client expects to recieve a HelloVerifyRequest from the server, which is important
to avoid Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. If the client does not recieve this message,
it could be that the ClientHello or the HelloVerifyRequest were dropped so they are
sent again. The timer is recommended to be between 500 and 100 ms [21].
Figure 2.2: DTLS Handshake Messages [21]
2.5 Industry Solutions
In this section some of the recent technologies are summarized, in addition to the
security measures that are taken during data exchange. The technologies discussed
are: LwM2M by OMA, Apple Homekit, Xiaomi IoT Cloud and Google Cloud.
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2.5.1 LwM2M
OMA SpecWork’s LightWeightM2M (LwM2M) is a device management protocol.
It was first designed to be used in sensor networks and to cater to the demands of
M2M environment. More than 25 companies are using LwM2M in their products
and services, for instance Nokia’s IMPACT IoT Platform and Huawei’s OceanCon-
nect IoT Platform [4]. The protocol which is designed for remote management of
M2M devices is based on REST architecture and builds on the secure data trans-
fer standard Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [20]. The protocol supports
various credentials for secure communications such as: certificates, raw public keys
and pre-shared secrets which are mentioned for their use with TLS/DTLS [22].
According to OMA’s technical specification [4], the overall structure of the
LwM2M has four interfaces: (1) Bootstrap, (2) Client Registration, (3) Device
Management and Service Enablement and finally (4) Information Reporting. It is
required from OMA that all the communication between LwM2M clients, LwM2M
servers and LwM2M Bootstrapping servers to have mutual authentication and that
the communication to be encrypted and integrity protected between these entities
(LwM2M clients, LwM2M servers and LwM2M Bootstrapping servers). When it
comes to Ciphersuits, a set of algorithms are used to secure a network connection
that uses SSL or even TLS. LwM2M Clients and LwM2M server support a limited
number of CipherSuits that depend mainly on the following: their suitability for
IoT devices, security reasons and their ability to improve interoperability. LwM2M
supports Elliptic Curves (EC), for ECDHE the group secp256r1 shall be supported.
As well as, for ECDSA the curve secp256r1 shall be supported. It is important to
note that the EC of less than 255 bits shall not be supported.
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2.5.1.1 Bootstrap Modes
LwM2M defines four Bootstrapping modes: (1) Factory Bootstrap, (2) Bootstrap
from Smartcard, (3) Client Initiated Bootstrap and (4) Server Initiated Bootstrap.
In both the Client Initiated Bootstrap and the Server Initiated Bootstrap, they
require the help of a LwM2M Bootstrap-Server to achieve the goal of connecting an
LwM2M Client to their LwM2M Server(s).
(1) Factory Bootstrap In this mode, the LwM2M Client is configured with the
required bootstrap information before the deployment of the device.
(2) Bootstrap from Smartcard In the case that the device requires a smartcard
for bootstrapping, a secure channel should be established between the SmartCard
and the LwM2M device. When the retrieval of the Bootstrap data is successful,
the bootstrap data from the Smartcard must be processed by the LwM2M client
and should apply the bootstrap information to its configuration for the purpose of
enhancing security.
(3) Client Initiated Bootstrap In this mode, the LwM2M Client contacts the
LwM2M Bootstrap-Server to retrieve bootstrap information. In order to contact
LwM2M Bootstrap-Server, the client must be pre-configured with information to
connect to the Bootstrap-Server and secure the connection. A perquisite for this
step is to have the LwM2M Bootstrap Server Account preloaded with the LwM2M
Client and the DTLS/TLS or OSCORE security credentials present to authenticate
the LwM2M bootstrapping server as shown in Figure 2.3. This is explained in detail
as the Client Initiated Bootstrap is the method that represents the basis of the soltu-
ion in this thesis. The first step is the LwM2M Client sending a Bootstrap-Request
operation to the LwM2M Bootstrap-Server URI. The request should contain the
LwM2M Client’s Name as a parameter to allow for proper provisioning of informa-
tion for the LwM2M Client. The next step is to configure the bootstrap information
of the LwM2M Client uisng the Write and/or Delete operations by the LwM2M
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Figure 2.3: Client Initiated Bootstrap [4]
Server. When the LwM2M Server has finished sending the bootstrap information
to the LwM2M Client, the server MUST send a Bootstrap Finish to the Client to
end this phase. Finally, if the process was successful that means that the Bootstrap
Finish has been received by the LwM2M Client and the configuration is depend-
able by the LwM2M Client. However, if the Bootstrapping was unsuccessful, the
Bootstrap-Server must retain the values that it had before the unsuccessful attempt
had occurred.
(4) Server Initiated Bootstrap In the Server Initiated Bootstrap mode, the Boot-
strap sequence is initialized by an authorized LwM2M Server. The process is as
follows: the LwM2M Server triggers the LwM2M Client to go in the Client Initiated
Bootstrap instead of another protocol for setting up the Bootstrap information from
the LwM2M Client.
When it comes to the Bootstrap-Request Trigger as illustrated in Figure 2.4, it is
executed from a resource available in the Server Object Instance. This step cannot
be performed if there is no connection available between the LwM2M Server and
the LwM2M Client in order to enter this Server Initiated Bootstrap mode.
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Figure 2.4: Server Initiated Bootstrap [4]
2.5.2 Apple Homekit
Apple Homekit is Apple’s solution for consumer IoT network. It is a framework that
allows users to control various devices. HomeKit is the app that provides an user
interface to coordinate and control home automation accessories. There are various
HomeKit compatible devices on the market and they range from but not limited to:
lights, switches, thermostats, cameras and doorbells [23].
The pairing process may vary with regards to the different certified devices,
however, all of them depend on transferring static codes over OOB channel [12].
The serial code exists on the device itself or on the packaging of which the device
comes from. An example for this, is Eve Energy (Smart Plug and Power Meter)
[24] that provides features such as voice control, power consumption and built in
schedules. The device is plugged into a power socket, it lightens up ready to be
paired. The user has two options from the Home App, (1) to scan the QR code and
(2) to enter an 8-digit pass-code. Both the QR code and 8-digit pass-code are found
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on retail packaging.
Apple requires accessories that interact with apple device to be MFi certified.
Apple’s Inc. MFi program is an abbreviation for “Made for iPhone/iPod/iPad”
which is basically a licensing program made for developers wanting to work with
the previously mentioned Apple devices. When the certification is acquired for
the device, the users are able to access the accessory protocol specification and
the communication protocol used to communicate with iOS and macOS devices
[25]. MFi allows an accessory to prove that it has been approved by Apple to
be used with Apple devices. Apple provides two different mechanisms for MFi
Authentication: (1) A dedicated hardware based approach where accessories must
emded a dedicated authentication chip known as the MFi Chip on the platform. (2)
A software authentication method where the accessory receives one time token that
can be used to authenticate itself during device activation in Home kit environment
.The verification requires that the software authentication is based on accessory-
specific token where the developer needs to create a licensee server to request these
tokens. The tokens are then supplied to the accessory and finally the tokens are
validated through Apple’s and the licensee’s servers [26].
HomeKit Accessory Protocol (HAP) is utilized by Apple’s Homekit to establish
a long-term relationship between the iOS device and a HAP accessory. The protocol
includes the following phases: (1) the shared key is derived from an 8-digit pass-
code. This is referred to as the Secure Remote Password (SRP). (2) MFi proof which
is referred to in the previous paragraph, where a token is verified or an IC chip. (3)
exchange of long-term public keys and parameters of the pairing entities [26]. The
data can be synchronized between the user’s iOS device using iCloud backup and
iCloud KeyChain as illustrated in Figure 2.6. Apple’s Keychain enables the apps to
store passwords, keys, certificates and other types of data.
When it comes to using SRP to secure the pairing process as illustrated in
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Figure 2.5, the process of generating the key is as follows [26]: SHA-512 is used as
the hash function, in case the SRP reference implementation provided by Stanford
is used then the function generates the Session Key, K, from the Pre-master Secret,
S, which should be changed from Mask Generation Function 1, t_mgf1(), to the
specified hash function, SHA-512. The Modulus, N, and Generator, g, are specified
by the 3072-bit group RFC 5054 [27].
Figure 2.5: Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol [28]
In HAP there is a client that is always the controller. Its role is visible in
sending and receiving responses from HAP accessory servers. In addition to that,
the HAP client is responsible for registering and receiving notifications from HAP
accessory servers. Another important component in HAP is the HAP accessory
server, its role is mainly to expose the HomeKit accessories to the HAP controller(s).
The HAP accessory server has the following features: it is always the accessory, it
accepts requests from clients and sends responses back and it delivers notifications to
registered clients. Finally, the HAP Accessory Objects which represents the physical
accessory on the HAP server. For instance: a thermostat.
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Figure 2.6: HomeKit Data Synchronization between devices [28]
2.5.3 Xiaomi IoT Cloud
Xiaomi is a growing ecosystem due to its relatively competitive price [29]. Xiaomi
claims to have the biggest IoT device base worldwide with 85 million devices [30] at
an advantage of having different vendors for one ecosystem. The following finding
are not published on Xiaomi’s official website but in fact were a result of reverse
engineering by Giese [31]. Xiaomi’s IoT architecture is cloud based. In summary,
the Xiaomi cloud works using three main technologies: HTTP, WiFi and Zigbee
which is a specification for network protocols [31]. The ecosystem is composed also
of a mobile phone containing the smart home app that is used to provision the device
with credentials connect it to the WiFi. Eventually when connected, each device
has its own connection to the cloud.
Narrowing it more to the connection between the cloud and the device, the
following credentials are needed: The DeviceID and Keys. The DeviceID is unique
for every device. The Keys are the cloud key which is a 16 bit alpha-numeric that
is used for cloud communication (AES) and is static. The other key is the token (16
bit alpha-numeric) which is provisioned when the device is connected to a new WiFi
Access Point. Moving on to the cloud protocol, the messages are JSON-formatted
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messages. A number of updates can be performed over the cloud using this protocol
such as APP updates which is the usual software on the device, MCU/WiFi updates
and sub-device updates [31].
2.5.4 Google Cloud
Google IoT Cloud [32] allows secure, manageable, and ingested data that is trans-
ported from IoT devices to a storage medium i.e Cloud. It supports two main pro-
tocols for device connection and communication: MQTT which is an open OASIS
and ISO standard lightweight which is common in M2M and HTTP (connection-less
protocol). Devices communicate with these protocols using bridges such as MQTT
bridge or HTTP bridge. The main advantages of both protocols is that MQTT uses
lower bandwidth and latency with a high throughput while HTTP is lightweight
and causes fewer firewall complexities. One downfall though is that HTTP requires
base-64 which exhausts more CPU resources. When it comes to device security, both
bridges (MQTT and HTTP) use asymmetric encryption pre-device public/private
key encryption with JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). The benefit here is limiting the
surface of an attack therefore if the device is compromised, it affects that one device
only not the entire network of devices. The JWTs also expires after a certain amount
of time so it is limited. The Cloud IoT Core also supports both RSA and Elliptic
Curve Algorithms to verify signatures. The device uses TLS1.2 for root certificate
authorities, which is required by MQTT. When it comes to Provisioning Creden-
tials the provisioner which is the user has permissions to create a device. Using the
IoT Cloud Core API, the user is able to create a logical device on the cloud. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.5.4. The steps are as follows: (1) The key pair is gener-
ated by the provisioner i.e. user, (2) the provisioner initializes the device using the
Cloud IoT Core API and specifying the public key which is used for verification, (3)
The device manager sends out a positive response that the device was created and
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finally (4) The private key is saved in the device for authentication where the Hard-
ware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is used. As for the Authentication, Figure
Device Provisioner Device Manager
Create Key Pair
Save Device 
Public Key 
Association
Store Private Key OK
Create Device (DeviceID, public key)
Figure 2.7: Provisioning Credentials [32]
2.8 summarizes the process in Cloud IoT Core with the help of MQTT protocol.
Firstly, (1) The device creates a JWT which is signed with a private key (2) Upon
connecting to the MQTT bridge, the device shows the JWT as the password in the
Connect message. (3) The MQTT performs the verification on the JWT using the
public key of the device. (4) MQTT bridge accepts the connection and finally (5)
When the JWT expires, the connection is immediately closed.
2.6 Android Secure Storage
The security of android devices has grown to be critically important due to vulnera-
bilities that were found in the Android design. In this section, the hardware-backed
secure storage of an Android System is further looked at. If the device contains em-
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Device MQTT Bridge
Create JWT
Verify JWT Signature 
with Public Key
Connected
Connected (DeviceID, JWT)
Figure 2.8: Authentication [32]
bedded secure hardware such as a TEE, the keys are safely stored there and provide
extra protection.
2.6.1 Android KeyStore
The Android KeyStore was first introduced in API 14 [33] and it communicates with
the service keystore which uses Inter Process Communication (IPC). The keystore
is launched upon device boot. It allows for storage of cryptographic keys in a place
where it is difficult to extract from the device. As the keys are in the keystore,
it allows for use of cryptographic operations with the key materials being non-
exportable.
The keys are protected by never entering the application processes; the plaintext,
ciphertext and messages to be signed enter the system processes which carries out
the necessary cryptographic operations. In case an attacker is able to gain access
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to the app’s process, the app’s keys might be used but the keys material cannot
be viewed or extracted. This is because the key material is bound to the secure
hardware for instance TEE, Secure Element (SE) of the device. This ensures that
the key material is not exposed outside the hardware.
There are two variants in the Android Key Store, the first being Software-based
and Hardware-based. Where it means that either software or hardware security
features are utilized to protect the keystore respectively. In the Software-based
variant, some ARM chips do not contain the TrustZone support, while in other
cases, the manufacturers are not able to create applications to support TEE. A
software equivalent to KeyMaster trustlet is created.
A provider can be defined to perform cryptographic operations. A popular ex-
ample of this is Bouncy Castle, a collection of APIs used to provide cryptographic
capabilities to the Java environment. There is a repackaging for Bouncy Castle called
Spongy Castle used for Android. However, the support and maintenance on Spongy
Castle has been stopped, and when attempted to apply it to the implementation of
the HomeApp, Bouncy Castle functioned just as fine with Android.
2.6.1.1 Trusted Execution Environment
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) enables secure execution of application.
It is based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and a trusted kernel. Applications
running inside the TEE are called Trustlets, they are designated to run specifically
inside a trustbox. The trustlets define an interface that specifies which data can
transfer between the trustbox and the trusted world [34].
According to Vasudevan, Owusu et al. a number of requirements are provided
to ensure a proper Trusted Execution Environment, a more technology-neutral ap-
proach [35]:
• Isolated execution: application should be allowed to run in isolation from
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other applications in TEE. This provides secrecy and integrity of the code and
sensitive information during run-time.
• Secure storage: this is provided using file system permissions, naturally en-
forced by the operating system. Secure storage offers the ability to maintain
the secrecy and integrity of binaries that represent the application when not
in run-time. Upon compromising the OS or removing the storage media, such
files can then be accessed directly.
• Remote attestation: is allowing verification of the authenticity of a specific
message from a particular software module that implements TEE.
• Secure provisioning: allowing data to be sent to a specific module or software
on a specific device while providing secrecy and integrity of the data being
communicated.
• Trusted path: in order to allow for the communication of the execution en-
vironment with the outside world while maintaining the authenticity of data,
one hand a party must verify the source of the communicated data from the
execution environment. Trusted path can allow for secrecy and availability.
2.6.2 Permissions
According to Android Developer official website4, before Marshmallow (API 23)
permissions were much simpler and were all handled during install-time. Upon
downloading an application from the Google Play store the user is shown a list
of permissions that are required for the application in which he either accepts all
permissions or does not install the app anymore. It was not possible for the user to
grant/revoke specific permissions after the application was installed.
4Android Developers: developer.android.com
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 26
1. Install-Time Permissions: also known as Normal Permissions are certain per-
missions that are categorized to be safe and possibly can’t do much harm.
These permissions are automatically granted at install time and are never
prompted to the user during install time. Install-Time Permissions include:
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE and INTERNET.
2. Run-Time Permissions: other permissions that are not listed under Install-
Time permissions. The user needs to deal with Run-Time permissions by
allowing or declining that permission(s) that is requested. The Run-Time per-
missions usually show up as a dialogue. An example for this is: READ_CONTACTS
permission.
A paper written by Fang, Han, and Li [36] touched into the topic of permission
based android security and the possible vulnerabilities. Coarse granularity of permis-
sions is where an application is provided with arbitrary access to certain resources.
Taking into example an INTERNET permission, this permission allows full control of
the internet access of the application including the ability to send HTTP requests
to all domains and connect freely to any destination. As much as the INTERNET
permission is necessary for many apps, the users are unable to control or restrict its
usage. A malicious application could camouflage and legitimize its purpose in order
to abuse the INTERNET permission. One aspect to view the counter measure for this
issue is to create a much more flexible and fine-grained permission models, these
could be context-aware models. It could be useful to deploy standard access con-
trol policy languages for example XACML to translate Android Permissions. The
benefits of this outweigh the degradation that might occur.
3 Architectural Design and System
Components
Chapter 3 describes the architecture and design of the system. Section 2.1 of this
thesis presented the life cycle model of IoT devices. Figure 3.2 is an adaptation of
the life cycle of the IoT device from the above definition. The highlighted aspect
of the life cycle of a simple device in this thesis is the bootstrapping procedure and
the operational mode of the simple device.
The different components of building the system are discussed along with their
relationship with each other and the information exchanged at the different stages
of the life cycle. The discussion includes details of the two components of the system
that are the LwM2M Client and LwM2M Server. In addition to the different inter-
faces and operations performed and finally the Android infrastructure and security
aspects of it.
Figure 3.1: Life cycle modes of a simple device [28]
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3.1 System Architecture
In this section, a brief description of the proposed system architecture including the
simple device, Controller and their structure is explained1.
The overall system architecture of the proposed solution is presented in Figure
3.2 including various entities and the interfaces available. The Controller entity can
include one or more of the following three entities:
Figure 3.2: Architecture [28]
• Bootstrapping entity: in this phase, the bootstrapping occurs between the
simple device and the controller in factory mode.
• Management: during operational mode the management interface is used to
control the simple device.
• Usage: the usage interface is used to access the service offered by the simple
device.
It is important to point out that the entities (bootstrapping, management and usage)
do not necessarily have to exist in the same physical device. The controller entities
1The proposed architecture is based on Huawei-internal document [28]
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can be distributed across different locations. For instance, the management can be
on a remote server, while the bootstrapping can be on a mobile phone.
3.1.1 Simple device
The simple device represents the entity that controls its features and provides access
to these features to an external party or a control entity. The main function of a
simple device is to authenticate the external party and create an access control point
to access the features. In this framework the Simple Device acts as an LwM2M
Client.
According to Figure 3.1 which is an applied diagram of Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1.
The initial step is the Manufacturing of the simple device where credentials, specific
device keys and root anchors are injected during the manufacturing process. Fol-
lowing is Bootstrapping to ensure the Controller Bootstraps with the correct device
which is intended by the user. Finally in the Operational Mode the simple device
is managed by the Controller with a secure communication based on operational
credentials.
3.1.2 Controller
In this framework the Controller runs the LwM2M bootstrap server and the LwM2M
Server. The Controller is responsible for bootstrapping and managing the device.
Further details are discussed in the upcoming sections about its functionality.
3.1.2.1 Bootstrap Entity
Bootstrapping entity communicates with the simple device over the Bootstrap in-
terface. It is mainly responsible for the bootstrapping procedure when the simple
device is in factory mode. After the bootstrapping is successful, the device switches
to operational mode.
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The role of the bootstrap entity is to use the device credentials of the simple
device to enhance the security of the communication between the bootstrapping
entity and the simple device. The simple device credentials may include but are not
limited to: Symmetric key, Asymmetric key pair, Asymmetric key pair and device
certificate. When using the device certificate as a credential, the authentication is
provided via OOB channel. The simple device certificate provides additional means
to authenticate the simple device remotely.
Other credentials are the operational credentials that are provisioned during the
bootstrapping procedure. These include but are not limited to: Asymmetric key
pair, Certificate, Symmetric key, key identifier (created during the bootstrapping
and must be unique) and Trust roots. Operational credentials are used to perform
authentication of device and entities and negotiate authenticated key agreement to
provide confidentiality and integrity protocol in communication.
The certificates issues to the devices and trust roots together form an end user
specific PKI. Where the user’s devices are able to authenticate each other.
3.1.2.2 Management entity
Management entity communicates with the simple device over the management in-
terface. During operational mode, the management entity manages the simple de-
vice.
3.1.2.3 Usage Entity
The usage entity communicates with the simple device over the usage interface.
During operational mode, it is responsible for using the simple device.
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3.1.3 Interfaces
There are four main interfaces in the architecture of the LwM2M enabler illustrated
in Figure 4.2 are: (1) OOB, (2) Bootstrap, (3) Device Management and Service
Enablement and (4) Usage Interface. An enabler represents a layer of communication
protocol between the LWM2M Server and LwM2M Client in addition to the LwM2M
Bootstrap Server and LwM2M Client.
3.1.3.1 Out-of-Band (OOB)
Out-of-Band (OOB) is used to provide additional authentication mechanisms that
aid in increasing the security of the bootstrapping interface. In addition to that,
it assists in further enhancement of the discovery mechanism between the simple
device and the bootstrapping entity.
3.1.3.2 Bootstrap interface
A Bootstrap Interface mentioned in Section 2.2 provisions operational credentials
such as key pairs, certificate and trust roots. In addition to connectivity settings
(Home network details). The LwM2M Client must have the LwM2M Bootstrap
information after the Bootstrap sequence. The client must have at least one LwM2M
Server account after the Bootstrap sequence and may also contain additional object
instances and security object instances [4]. This is used to register the LwM2M
Client to the LwM2M Server.
The highlighted steps in Bootstrapping that are emphasized throughout this
thesis are:
1. Data transfer using OOB Channel: the communication over the OOB interface
involves the user. For example, one of the possible methods to make the
OOB transfer of information from simple device to Controller is through QR
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Code scanning; when the Controller device scans the QR code from the simple
device.
2. Discovery of simple device: the simple device acts as a WiFi access point when
it is first powered on. The Controller receives the WiFi network details over
the bootstrap interface as stated previously in data transfer in OOB stage
point. In operational mode, after successful bootstrapping, the simple device
stops acting as an access point and joins instead the WiFi network that the
Controller Configured during the Bootstrapping procedure.
3. Establishing a secure connection: this is done using DTLS. After the device
discovery, the bootstrapping procedure continues to the DTLS session setup.
The DTLS session is initiated by the simple device.
4. Authenticating the simple device and the Controller: this is to make sure that
the simple device is connected to the “right” Controller and vice versa. This
is done through recieving the simple device credentials when the Controller
verifies the device’s credentials with the information received over the OOB
interface.
5. Configuring simple device: here the device moves from factory to operational
mode.
3.1.3.3 Management Interface
The Device Management and Service Enablement Interface are used by the LwM2M
Server to gain access to the Object Instances and Resources present in the LwM2M
Client. The Operations available for this interface are: Create, Execute, Delete,
Write, Write-attribute, Read. Read-attribute. Delete and Discover.
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3.1.3.4 Usage interface
Usage interface is used to operate the simple device. It is responsible for operations
related to the features of the simple device.
3.2 Leveraging LwM2M features
Here the LwM2M features are leveraged for the simple device during the life cycle
management process.
3.2.1 LwM2M Client
The LwM2M Client in Figure 3.3 assists as an end point of the LwM2M protocol
that communicates with the LwM2M Server in order to execute operations from
the LwM2M Server to the device such as Device Management and Information
Reporting.
3.2.2 LwM2M Bootstrap Server
The LwM2M Bootstrap Server provides the LwM2M Server account information by
updating the security object instance.
3.2.3 LwM2M Server
A LwM2M Server is a logical entity that sits within the Machine to Machine Ser-
vice Provider and represents one of the end points of the LwM2M communication
protocol.
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the Target System
3.2.4 Realization of Architectural interfaces
Here the architectural interfaces are realized using LwM2M interfaces. This is also
a more specified description regarding the choices made in this thesis to adapt to
the standards of LwM2M.
3.2.4.1 OOB
Communication over OOB typically involves the user, to different degrees according
to varying scenarios. The involvement could be the user scanning a QR code on
the simple device with his/her smart phone’s camera which in turn binds the simple
device to the Controller.
The user turns on the simple device, starts the QR reading functionality on
the Controller device and attempts to scan the QR code from the simple device
which encodes the device’s unique identifier, Wifi SSID and other data via the OOB
channel. The controller then joins the WiFi network of the Access point (AP) in
the simple device.
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3.2.4.2 Bootstrap interface
The bootstrapping procedure involved configuring the simple device by the Con-
troller and moving the simple device from a factory reset state to operational mode.
This is the standard bootstrapping procedure based on LwM2M specifications [4].
Two main additions are introduced in this thesis: during bootstrapping, (1) a pro-
cess of transferring a unique identifier of a simple device through the OOB channel
to the Controller. This unique identifier could be: PSK, PK or certificate. (2) Bind-
ing of the simple device’s credentials that are received by the Controller over OOB,
to be able to communicate through an in-band Channel such as WiFi.
After device discovery, the bootstrapping process is resumed to a DTLS session
setup which is initiated by the LwM2M Client (simple device). More is discussed on
client initiated bootstrap in Section 2.5.1.1. After a successful DTLS handshake, a
confidential and integrity-protected channel is achieved over the in-band interface.
The bootstrapping steps along with the additions can be summarized to the
following points:
1. Discovery of the simple device by the Controller.
2. Creation of Credentials and integrity protected Channel between the Simple
device and the Controller.
3. Channel binding which means that the Controller paired with the right simple
device through correct credentials.
4. Agreement on long-term keys and other operational credentials
3.2.4.3 Management interface
The management interface may include the possibility to add, modify and remove
operational credentials and trust roots. It may also include initiating a factory reset
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of the simple device. A client registration interface can be used. The Client Regis-
tration interface shown in Figure 3.2. The LwM2M Client must be able to support
the following operations: Register, Update and De-register operations. While the
LwM2M Server must support all operations on this interface. The Client Registra-
tion interface is used by an LwM2M Server to register with one or more LwM2M
Servers. The Register-Operation is used by the Client while providing the necessary
information for the LwM2M Server while maintaining the registration and commu-
nication sessions with the LwM2M Server on the basis of configuration parameters,
for instance the Que Mode or Lifetime. Finally, the LwM2M performs a De-register
operation upon discontinuing the use of a LwM2M Server.
3.2.4.4 Usage interface
In the usage interface, operations that are related to the features of the device
are carried out. An interface that can be used as a usage interface is the Infor-
mation Reporting Interface. It observes alterations in a Resource(s) belonging to
the LwM2M Client. Upon addition of new values, notifications are received by the
LwM2M Server. This is achieved by sending either one of the operations Observe
and Observe-Composite to the LwM2M Client to gain information about an Object,
Object instance or a Resource. To terminate this operation, the LwM2M Server
sends a Cancel Observation or Cancel Observation-Composite to be performed. It
is important to note that the LwM2M must ignore any Observation Operation if it
has not received a Registration acknowledgement.
4 Implementation
Chapter 4 includes the implementation on the basis of the system architecture in
Chapter 3. Figure 4.1 summarizes the solution proposed in this thesis for securing
the bootstrapping and registration of the simple device using a Controller.
Figure 4.1: Experimental Setup
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4.1 Simple device
The LwM2M Client is implemented on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ using MbedTLS
open source library for DLS/TLS in C, more details are found in the following
master’s thesis [37]. The main functionality of Raspberry Pi is acting as an access
point to the Controller to provision bootstrapping credentials to the simple device.
More are details discussed about provisioning of credentials is found in Section 4.5.
4.2 Controller device
Leshan is an OMA LwM2M server and client Java implementation library [38].
In this setup, Leshan is used to implement the LwM2M Server and the LwM2M
Bootstrap server.
The LwM2M enabler is discussed in detail in Section 3.1.3. It defines the appli-
cation layer communication protocol between the server and client. The following
logical interfaces are defined for this thesis:
1. Bootstrapping
2. Device Discovery and Registration
3. Device Management and Service Enablement
Information reporting is not yet implemented in this phase of the thesis but is a
part of future development.
For setting up the environment, Android Studio is used with Java. The compiled
SDK version is API 28 intended to run on Huawei P30 pro test phone. The graphical
user interface (GUI) was sketched using MockFlow [39] which was later implemented
using Android studio layout features as xml files.
There are three main configurations to run the framework:
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1. Running the Server and the Bootstrap Server in the Android application along-
side the LwM2M Server and Bootstrap Server as a whole system in the same
device.
2. Dedicating a gateway (home router) where the Android application runs the
Server and the Bootstrap Server while the LwM2M Server and LwM2M Boot-
strap server runs on a home router in the same network.
3. Android app runs the Server and the Bootstrap Server while the LwM2M
Server and LwM2M Bootstrap server run on a cloud service which the user
trusts.
For this thesis, option (2) is used. Option (1) is a part of future enhancements.
4.2.1 Bootstrap Server and LwM2M Server
The Bootstrap Interface consists of a set of operations used to initialize the required
objects to the LwM2M Client to register, such as uplink operation which includes
Bootstrap-Request and downlink operations under the names of Discover, Write,
Read(restricted), Delete and Bootstrap-Finish illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The Bootstrap Operations used in the Bootstrap Server in further details are as
follows: (earlier description found in Section 3.1.3.2:
1. Bootstrap-Request Operation: used to initiate a Bootstrap sequence during
Client Initiated Bootstrap which is a Bootstrap mode that retrieves Bootstrap
Information from the LwM2M Bootstrap-Server Account.
2. Bootstrap-Finish Operation: in order to terminate a Bootstrap Sequence that
was previously initiated during the Client Initiated Bootstrap mode. The main
goal of this operation is to notify the LwM2M Client that the necessary Boot-
strap information have been provided by the LwM2M Bootstrap-Server.
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Figure 4.2: Interaction between Android, LwM2M Server and LwM2M CLient
3. Bootstrap-Discover Operation: the main purpose of this operation is to rec-
ognize LwM2M Objects and Object instances that are supported by a specific
LwM2M Client. It is not required to specify the Object ID, a targeted path is
accepted instead of an Object ID. This notifies the Client to show all existing
Object instances.
4. Bootstrap-Read Operation: The read operation must be restricted to include
the Objects required to perform a proper configuration of an LwM2M Client.
These objects are: LwM2M Server Object (Object ID: 1) and Access Control
Object (Object: 2). These allow the Bootstrap Server to validate the present
server accounts and add new ones without violating the present Access Control
rights in the LwM2M Client.
5. Bootstrap-Write Operation: this operation can be sent multiple times. In
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the Bootstrap-Write operation if the LwM2M does not support the optional
resource, it must not instantiate Objects for those but must silently ignore.
6. Bootstrap-Delete Operation: like the Bootstrap-Write operation, this can be
sent multiple times. The Bootstrap-Delete can be used with any instance or
all instances of any Object which is supported by the LwM2M Client.
To set up the LwM2M Server and the Bootstrap Server, the implementation provided
by Leshan is used. In order to integrate it with Android, the Leshan library modules
are compiled into jar files that are loaded as libraries to be used for the Server
and Bootstrap Server implementations. Once that is done, a Leshan UI sandbox
is available for testing using http:\\Server-IP_addr:8080 to run in local host or
through testing the LwM2M Server at https:\\leshan.eclipseprojects.io\ and
the Bootstrap Server at https:\\leshan.eclipseprojects.io\bs\ these web UIs
allow easy management of LwM2M client devices. It is important to note that
for authentication, X.509 certificate authentication is used for Bootstrapping and
Server protocols through proximity authentication. However, the LwM2M Server
certificate is ignored by the LwM2M Client.
4.3 OOB
Out of Band (OOB) interface is used to provide an additional authentication method
to further secure the bootstrapping interface. Another usage of OOB, is to enhance
the discovery mechanism between the simple device and the Controller before the
execution of the bootstrapping attempt. OOB channel is exhibited when the QR
code sticker is seen on the simple device, then the Controller attempts to bootstrap
by capturing the QR code using the mobile device’s camera.
Three bootstrapping techniques are used in the Android application on the basis
of the discussion in Section 2.2. The bootstrapping method chosen for this prototype
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is Client Initiated Bootstrap which is explained in detail in Section 2.5.1.1, which
shortly allows for the LwM2M Client to retrieve bootstrapping information from the
LwM2M Bootstrap Server which is situated in the Controller.
1. QR Code Scanning: As explained in Section 2.2 QR code is the most pop-
ular method used nowadays to gain control or access different types of infor-
mation, which is the reason why it is considered the primary OOB channel
method to be offered to the user. The QR code is implemented using ZX-
ing Android Embedded Library1 which is based on ZXing Android Barcode
Scanning Application. This library is used because it is easily integrated with
Android and provides advanced customization of the logic and UI. Processing
wise, the camera launched during QR code scanning is managed in a back-
ground thread which reduces the start up time, therefore reducing the waiting
time for the user. The version used for this prototype is 4.1.0 which requires
SDK 24+.
1ZXing Android Embedded Repository: github.com/journeyapps/zxing-android-embedded
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Figure 4.3: OOB Message Structure [37]
The hash encoded in the QR code is 128 bits in length using SHA256 digest of
the LwM2M Client Certificate. The QR Code is then printed and placed on
the IoT device and its package to be used during the bootstrapping process.
The format of the QR code message is illustrated in Figure 4.3. This hash is
used for the purpose of illustrating the message structure:
01;WIFI;WPA2-PSK:huawei_iot:c1e7d64c383e;03;367f36ee1f5e272cfbca1
ca35a73e42b;34;;.
Below are the details of the encoded information:
(a) Protocol Version: here 01 is used.
(b) In-band channel type: WiFi is the choice of the in-band channel commu-
nication protocol.
(c) Device Credentials type: 00, 01, 02, 03 allocated for the no security (leap-
of-faith), PSK, RPK and X.509 certificate respectively.
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(d) WPA2-PSK:huawei_iot:c1e7d64c383e: is the credentials for the in-band
communication channel. This field refers to encryption_algorithm:SSID:PSK.
This field also supports 802.11x based authentication.
(e) 367f36ee1f5e272cfbca1ca35a73e42b: is the left most 16 bytes of the
SHA-256 hash output of LwM2M Client (simple device) device certificate.
(f) 34: is the checksum value for manual entry. This is the left most 1 byte of
the SHA-256 hash output of the left most 16 bytes of the LwM2M Client
(simple device) device certificate.
2. Optical Character Recognition: this feature is implemented with the help
of Firebase2 which relies on Machine Learning with an on-device or cloud-based
API to recognize latin letters.
3. Manual URI entry: the least preferred pairing method as it is prone to user
typing errors. Here, the user is given the option to manually type the URI
which is then verified in the same way against the certificate received from the
LwM2M Client.
4.4 Bootstrapping
This subsection in the thesis aims to answer RQ3 regarding protecting provisioning
credentials. To be able to answer that, it is vital to look into the two bootstrapping
phases that enable establishing protection and security during bootstrapping and
operational modes.
The bootstrapping phase in this thesis has two phases:
• Secure channel establishment: as mentioned in the previous Section 4.3 a
hash of the public key of the LwM2M Client is encoded in the QR code and
2firebase.google.com/docs/ml-kit/recognize-text
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provided over the OOB channel. This is exchanged during a DTLS channel
and is used to authenticate the simple device. For verifying the simple device,
the Controller must compare the hash of the public key provided during the
Bootstrap attempt with the hash of the certificate of the device recieved during
the DTLS handshake.
• Operational credential provisioning: once a DTLS channel is established be-
tween the LwM2M Client and the LwM2M Bootstrap Server, the LwM2M
client will receive provisioning credentials from the LwM2M Bootstrap Server
(Controller). The security object mode is set to Certificate mode.
With reference to 4.4 the simple device accepts the WiFi connection and an IP
is given to the Controller. A DTLS connection is established as shown in step 8.
The simple device sends a bootstrap request to the Client. The Controller provisions
server operational credentials that include: a key pair, an X.509 certificate and trust
roots and home network details. Both the Controller and simple device switch to
home network. It is vital to point that the simple device will restart in operational
mode.
4.5 Usage in operational mode
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the different system components interact with each other.
The process beings with the user launching the HomeApp and adding his/her home
network details to the settings. The user turns on the simple device for the first time
and uses his/her phone to scan the QR code on the simple device. As seen in step
6, the Controller extracts the authentication details in the QR code (see Section 4.4
for details) and connects to the device’s access point.
After the simple device has restarted in operational mode 4.4, the simple device
will then send a registry request and from there the Controller registers the device
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Figure 4.4: System Interactive Diagram
to the server and sends a 2.01 response as seen in step 17. Finally, the user is able
to see that the simple device is registered and can view details about the device in
addition to controlling its actions.
In order to manage the application with a real life scenario as illustrated in Figure
4.5, an LED light is managed remotely over the network. This is a good scenario as
LwM2M is a device management protocol layer which provides different management
functionalities. An LED is connected to the RaspBerry Pi device which represents
the LwM2M Client. After bootstrapping the device to the HomeApp successfully
using Leshan’s Bootstrap Server, the light source is able to be controlled and dimmed
or turned on/off using the control panel in the HomeApp. This is done by sending
HTTP requests to the web interface provided by Leshan Server which runs on a
second Raspberry Pi (could also a use a PC) as shown in the beginning of chapter
4 in Figure 4.1.
In addition to managing the LED light, the status of the light is seen with
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Figure 4.5: LwM2M Application Scenario - Control of an LED with the HomeApp
the help of the Observe operation through the LwM2M Server. Upon changing the
switch to on or off, the LwM2M server immediately notifies the LwM2M client which
received the change of event and the corresponding status was updated on the web
UI. An example of such HTTP request is shown in Figure 4.6.
One more important thing to note, in the experimental design setup the Le-
shan front-end is located in the phone and Leshan Server in the Raspberry Pi 2
communicate over HTTP. Note however, that in the actual home network this com-
munication should be secured, e.g., using HTTP with mutual authentication during
a handshake.
4.6 Storing Device Related Data
Shared Preferences in Android allow for storing primitive data or key/value pairs
in a file in the mobile device. The main purpose of using shared preferences in the
HomeApp is to store the Home network details which are sent during Bootstrapping
for the device to use to connect to the home network after the Bootstrapping attempt
is successful. In order to maintain the confidentiality of these details, the shared
preferences must be protected.
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Figure 4.6: Usage Interface
The Android framework provides Encryption of Shared Preferences using An-
droidX Security Library, the library runs using SDK 23 and above. An encryption
master key is stored in the Android Keystore using AES256_GCM_SPEC specification
for instance. Then an instance of EncryptedSharedPreferences is initialized which
is a wrapper around SharedPreferences. The Shared Preferences values can then
be read and stored securely.
4.6.1 Self-Signed Certificates
Self-Signed Certificates are a type of Certificate that is signed by the same issuer of
the certificates whose identity it certified. In other words, self-signed certificates are
signed with their own private key.
The issued certificates to the device and the trusted roots together play the role
of a Certification Authority (CA) since it uses PKI to implement the access control
of the simple device from the Controller entities (See Section 3.1.2). The added
difference here to the LwM2M Specifications is that this approach does not require
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a database to be maintained where all the trusted peers (Controllers) of the simple
device are stored. This is because a peer can be verified from a certificate presented
when the peer attempts to connect to a simple device.
A self-signed certificate for the LwM2M Bootstrap Server and Server is generated
with OpenSSL, which is a toolkit for TLS and SSL protocols and contains cryptog-
raphy libraries as well. The following command is run for that purpose req -x509
-sha256 -nodes -days 365 -keyout privateKey.key -out certificate.crt.
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4.7 User experience
In this section the design of the application GUI is illustrated and its functionality
is explained. The drive of this design is to provide a smooth user experience during
bootstrapping and registering phases. The application HomeApp uses eight screens
to ease the user experience when connecting to the simple device. The Figures 4.7
and 4.8 illustrate the flow between the screens of the HomeApp application. The
user starts by viewing the Control Panel upon application launch. From there, the
user is able to add accessories, navigate through the list of added accessories and
further more. The screens are explained in detail in the following subsections. It is
important to mention that the term Accessory is used interchangeably with the term
Device where they both mean the Simple Device. However, for simplicity purposes
IoT Device is not used as it may be complicated for the user to comprehend.
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Figure 4.7: Schematic UI Functionality Illustration (1)
Figure 4.8: Schematic UI Functionality Illustration (2)
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4.7.1 Screen 1: Control Panel
The Control Panel is visible upon launching the HomeApp. The Control Panel
contains the list of paired accessories connected to the application by the user. The
purpose of this screen is to present a panel to ease the control and operation of the
accessories from a single view. The user can also view the statistics and important
information regarding the paired accessories. An example for this is the battery
percentage of a simple device. The screen allows the user to add new accessory as
well.
Figure 4.9: Control Panel
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4.7.2 Screen 2: Operation and Control of the accessory
This screen is launched upon selecting a widget from the Control Panel screen in
Figure 4.9. The user is able to view all the information needed about the accessory.
In addition to that, the user is able to control the accessory. For instance, he/she
can toggle the on and off button.
Figure 4.10: Information about IoT Device
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4.7.3 Screen 3: Adding an Accessory
In the context of HomeApp, the addition of the accessory corresponds to bootstrap-
ping the accessory and registering it. This Add Accessory Screen is launched when
the user selects the plus sign button from the previous page. Here, the user finds
instructions on how to pair the simple device with the phone (Controller).
Figure 4.11: Adding Accessory
The instructions include but are not limited to: connecting the device to the
power supply in case it is disconnected, turning on the device .. etc. Below the
instructions, the user can find three options to pair his/her accessory. (1) Using
QR Code, (2) Using Text Recognition to read the URL and finally (3) Manual
entry of the URL into the application. HomeApp allows the user to swipe back and
forth between the pairing methods to choose whichever method is most convenient.
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However, the QR code is selected by default as it is the easiest option for the user.
4.7.4 Screen 4: Using QR Code
Here, the user aims the camera at the QR code of the device. It is essential that
the QR code is present completely in the frame of the camera screen in order to
successfully recognize it.
Figure 4.12: QR Code Scanner
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4.7.5 Screen 5: Text Recognition
If the user chooses this option, the camera must be aimed at the URL instead of the
QR code. The user should make sure that the whole text is captured in the camera
frame to ensure a successful process in reading the characters.
Figure 4.13: Text Recognition
CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION 57
4.7.6 Screen 6: Manual Character String Entry
The user is given the option to manually enter the URL into the application. This
option is not recommended as it is prone to human typing errors. However, it may
be used in the case when both QR code reading and character recognition fails.
Figure 4.14: Manual Character Entry
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4.7.7 Screen 7: Failure to Recognize and Add an Accessory
If the bootstrapping attempt fails, the user has the option to re-attempt through
the Try Again Button. From here, the user is redirected to the previous screen.
See figures 4.12, 4.13 or 4.14. This emphasizes on RQ4, to provide a user friendly
experience to the user during bootstrapping by providing a range of options to
perform this process.
Figure 4.15: Failed Attempt to Add Accessory
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4.7.8 Screen 8: Successful Adding of an Accessory
After a successful bootstrapping attempt, the user can either proceed back to the
Control Panel with the newly added accessory through the Next Button. Otherwise,
cancel the process using Cancel Button and return to the Control Panel but without
any new accessory added.
Figure 4.16: Successful Attempt to Add Accessory
5 Discussion and Analysis
Secure management and operation of IoT devices in people’s homes is one of the key
issues in consumer IoT. This thesis investigates an approach to secure management
and operation of IoT devices in people’s homes by adapting the LwM2M industrial
standard (LwM2M [4]) and using the smart phone as the Controller of home IoT
devices. A system architecture based on OMA LwM2M specifications [4] is designed;
an Android Application is implemented as a proof of concept. Chapter 5 discusses
and analyses the findings with regards to the underlying technologies used to im-
plement the solution i.e, LwM2M; and securing credentials and managing data and
secure usability that requires users intervening in the bootstrapping process.
In the rest of Chapter 5 the research questions stated in Section 1.2 are discussed.
For the reader’s convenience, the questions are repeated:
• RQ1: How to securely manage the life cycle of the device using a Controller
device?
• RQ2: What types of data should be transferred between the Controller and
the simple device and how to securely transfer and store them safely during
bootstrapping (initial setup) and operational modes (after bootstrapping)?
• RQ3: How can the Controller protect long-term credentials that need to be
provisioned to the simple device against cyber attacks?
• RQ4: How to provide a user friendly experience during the bootstrapping of
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the device using QR code reading?
5.1 Securing Credentials and Managing Data
During the device manufacturing, certain security measures (e.g data generated
using high entropy random function) are injected into the device securely in the
factory premises. The security measures may include one or all the following: the
device’s serial number, Pre-shared Key (PSK) and/or X.509 Certificate.
In this thesis, the scenario of using the Certificate is taken into consideration for
device authentication in OOB channels. Certificate authentication is based on Public
key infrastructure. Therefore the simple device with 32 bit MCUs must support
one of the following digital signature algorithms (RSA, DSA, ECDSA). ECDSA is
used for the purpose of being a better candidate for IoT devices in terms of energy
consumption and data throughput, specifically the curve secp256r1 outperformed
the curve secp224r1 [40].
To elaborate more on the answer for RQ1, The X.509 Certificate injected into
the simple IoT device which contains the public key that is used to authenticate the
device to the Controller during the bootstrap process when the User launches the
HomeApp on the Controller (mobile phone) and attempts to scan the QR code con-
taining a hash of the device’s certificate (128 bits). The QR code message structure
supported WiFi and Bluetooth but for the demonstration of the proof of concept of
the thesis, only WiFi in-band channel is used as illustrated in depth in Section 4.3.
Based on industrial-scale IoT devices, the LwM2M Clients (IoT Devices) are pre-
configured in a way that they can contact the LwM2M Bootstrap Server to begin
the bootstrapping process. Configuring the IoT devices to contact a centralized
Bootstrapping entity that is outside the consumer’s local network can lead to the
following privacy issues: (1) the centralized LwM2M Bootstrap Server requires the
knowledge of the LwM2M Server (Controller) which is typically a consumer device
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such as a smart phone to complete the bootstrapping. (2) When the LwM2M Client
contact the Bootstrap Server, the centralized server can build a profile of consumers.
Therefore, for more protection, a Controller that communicates with a simple device
is placed in a local network. In is important to note that, the LwM2M Client
(simple device) cannot be pre-configured with Bootstrap Server Account information
in a home context. This raises a security issue as if this were to be true, any
Controller connected to the local network will be able to influence the simple device
to bootstrap with it. To reduce the mis-binding possibility, private network details
(simple device’s access point) are exhibited by the simple device to the Controller.
The access point of the simple device is based on PKI, an advantage for this is that a
database is not needed to keep the information of all the trusted peers in the simple
device, since a peer can be verified from a certificate presented when it attempts to
connect to the simple device. In this way it acts as a CA.
Moving to the Controller, the general role of the controller lies in the life cy-
cle management of a device that starts from bootstrapping the device followed by
managing the operations of the device and performing the necessary updates to the
device such as updating the system components and firmware. A more specific role
of the controller is securing the communication in OOB channel and in in-band
channel. An important argument is the "creation" of trust when using public keys
or shared keys in OOB channel.
A key component in android security is providing endpoint authentication using
X.509 certificates. In this thesis self-signed certificates are used instead of CAs. The
certificate verified for it’s hash using the public key retrieved from the QR code
encoded data. The LwM2M Server certificate is ignored on the LwM2M Client side.
The significance of using channel binding is when tampering with the content of
the QR code or the LwM2M Client certificate, i.e. such as in MiTM attacks. This
will immediately invalidate the certificate, therefore protecting the security of the
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communication channel. Another point is that the Android Key store ensures that
the keys stored do not enter the application process so that even if the application
process is compromised the intruder cannot gain access of the keys.
For RQ3, During the bootstrapping procedure, the operational credentials that
are explained in Section 4.4 are provisioned to the LwM2M Client. These creden-
tials are transferred securely in a DTLS layer. The credentials include the key pair,
Bootstrap Server Certificate, connectivity settings which will be used by the device
when restarting in operational mode to connect to the home network like the Con-
troller in order to send and receive requests. The connectivity settings are stored in
an encrypted file format using Encrypted Shared Preferences as specified in Section
4.6. To decrease the scope of possible exploitation, the permission requests in the
application are limited to those strictly needed to avoid any mishandling of any of
the sensitive data associated with the permission as discussed in detail in Section
2.6.2.
When it comes to securing management data such as security, wireless and light
objects (since the example scenario is controlling the LED). It is important to secure
the communication between the device and the Controller which is achieved using
an encrypted channel i.e. DTLS. Upon sending the HTTP requests to the server and
then the CoAP messages to the device a DTLS connection allows for protection of
the management data against cyber attacks. The management data does not have
to be stored locally in the Controller device, even if it is the more secure option. As
that limits the chances for an attacker attempting to intercept the communication
tunnel to gain access of the management data in case it is stored in a server locally
in a home gateway or over a smart hub such as Amazon Echo1. The options of
storing the management data are also referred to as different setup configurations in
Section 4.2. However, data privacy challenges exist that come with cloud storage.
1Amazon Echo: https://www.amazon.com/smart-home-devices
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Some of the requirements include: (1) encryption of files with high-entropy keys
prior to uploading the files on the cloud. (2) The decryption keys are required to
only be accessible by the devices within the network domain [41]. From a secure
usability perspective, in addition to these security requirements, it is important that
the device authorization remains minimal and consistent.
5.2 Usable Security
In order to address RQ4, "Usable Security" is about involving the end user in the
process and providing a user friendly interface without compromising the security of
the system. Users should be limited to the parts of the system that they have access
to, to grant users authorization to certain tasks as they assist in critical processes.
In this prototype for instance, the bootstrapping cannot occur without the sup-
port of the user in terms of launching the app then choosing the pairing method of
preference (in this case QR code reading) and making the effort to point the mobile
device to the correct QR code. This is so a successful bootstrapping can occur.
Users hold the responsibility to correctly scan legitimate QR codes; as it is quite
common for malicious QR codes to contain compromised code that directs users to
secondary sites that contain possible risks on the security and privacy of the devices.
In addition to tampering with QR codes, users can be prone to phishing attacks or
cross-site scripting attacks [15]. QR codes can include more complex schemes to
make the process more difficult for the attacker to modify the original QR code.
According to a research by Kainda, Flechais, and Roscoe [13] a number of factors
affect the security, usability and eventually the success of OOB channels from a user’s
prospective. Users vary in the level of motivation to perform the security tasks
depending on the circumstances. Users can be distracted while performing these
tasks which leads to them shifting their attention away from the pairing process.
During OOB channel achievement, the application must not be demanding of the
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user’s constant attention which might lead to frustration on the user’s behalf in most
scenarios. In fact, this creates bigger chances of security failures. This in addition
to the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, has contributed to choosing a
visual and effective means of bootstrapping to avoid impatient user reaction during
a crucial authentication step.
Other secondary methods of bootstrapping are using OCR and manual entry
which are left to the user to decide which to use. Manual entry can be frustrating
depending on the length of the URL to be entered. According to the same study
[13], Compare and Confirm2 and Compare and Select3 methods have been ruled out
due to being highly responsible for security failures. This is where the choice of
the manual entry emerged to decrease the frustration of the user while entering a
string of values. The Checksum value in the URL helps identify the correctness of
the string during entry and alerts the user meanwhile.
Another aspect of usability enhancement that was taken into consideration when
designing this application that is not security related is attempting to reduce the
user’s wait perception through better design practices. According to a study on The
Effects of Visual Feedback Designs on Long Wait Time [42] results have shown that
there existed a correlation between the user’s perceived speed and the wait evalua-
tions. This translates to better wait experiences when progress speed is estimated
to be faster. The use of the progress bar is applied during attempting to bootstrap
the device as shown in Figure 5.2. These finding have played a major part in un-
derstanding the cues needed to manipulate the user’s wait experience to maintain
user’s attention which is estimated to be about 10 seconds [43]. Findings in 2012 by
Lallemand and Gronier [44], confirmed that progress bars are common indicators for
2CC: One way authentication where the user is required to press a button on their device only.
The hash value representations vary from numeric to alphanumeric and sound.
3CS: A string is displayed on one of the devices and four strings of the same format are displayed
on the other device. Values only include numeric and alphanumeric
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interface feedback and that users preferred non-linear speeds and preferred shorter
times unlike longer ones.
Figure 5.1: Use of progress bar during bootstrapping attempt
5.3 Limitations
Thie thesis was produced in the times of a widespread pandemic (COVID-19) and
with governmental regulations that were imposed to limit the spread of the virus
through restricting movement and enforcing social distancing regulations. Such
circumstances represented additional challenges to testing the prototype on a range
of devices and users. Based on these conditions, in Section 5.2 no data was provided
to support the claims of this thesis regarding the smoothness and user-friendliness
nature of the app and the appeal to the users.
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In addition to having an effect on testing the usability of the application, recom-
mendations following working remotely placed limitations on testing the different
components of the system proposed. This had a direct impact on increasing the
time span for testing separate units and the communication needed between the
team members, which directly reduced the efficiency of the work.
5.4 Future Work
Implementation wise and regarding the different fields of the OOB message in Section
4.3, it would be beneficial to support more in-band channel communication protocols
in addition to WiFi and other device credential types in addition to using X.509
certificates such as using Raw Public Key (RPK) or Pre-Shared Key (PSK).
The next step of the framework would be to support other interfaces in addition
to Bootstrapping and Device Discovery and Registration that are mentioned in
Section 4.2. The support should be extended to Information Reporting where the
LwM2M Server reports periodically to an LwM2M Client certain resources when
such a criteria are matched such as exceeding a specific threshold. In addition to
that, allowing the controller to be able to authenticate and control multiple devices
(nodes) at once. When there are many devices to bootstrap to, it becomes very
tidious to bootstrap with each and every device so it would easier to bootstrap
them all at once [45].
Another useful addition to the thesis, would be to implement Multi Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (MDHCP) on the LwM2M Client to be able to dy-
namically allocate the multicast of addresses of the devices connected to the same
access point. This would reduce power consumption as the device shouldn’t be on
all the time and it decreases response time as the device shouldn’t wait a long time
before using a multicast address.
Finally, since the framework has been implemented over two different parts that
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is the mobile device and the PC, the next step would be to move the Servlet classes
from the Server to Android locally.
6 Conclusion
Secure management and operation of IoT devices in people’s homes is one of the
key issues in consumer IoT. In this thesis an approach has been investigated where
this issue is solved by using a mobile device as a Controller device. A solution
for securely managing and using IoT devices in a home context has been designed
and implemented. This solution is based on OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine
(LwM2M) specifications [4].
The initial setup of the IoT device is done when the user scans the QR code of
the device with his/her smartphone’s camera. The security of the device’s setup is
based on the information in that QR code, which could include, e.g., the hash of
the device’s public key. Other methods to do the device’s setup using smartphone
have been considered as well. After the initial setup, the IoT device joins the home
WiFi network and is controlled from the smartphone of the user.
As part of a proof-of-concept demonstration an Android application has been
implemented for a user’s smartphone that does the QR code reading. The Home-
App utilizes Android Key Store to secure the generation and storage of keys, and
uses DTLS to secure communication between the devices. The application provides
a smooth user interface for connecting and controlling the IoT device. The imple-
mentation of the IoT device part in this proof-of-concept demonstration is a topic
of another master’s thesis [37].
Based on this implementation work it can be concluded that the approach inves-
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tigated in this thesis is practical, and it would be worthwhile to continue working
in this direction in the future. Future work could also include a usability study that
could not be done due to restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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